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INTRODUCTION
"Most new jobs are created in start-ups and small businesses.
So let's pass an agenda that helps them succeed."'
President Barack Obama, 2012 State of the Union Address
This is a story about U.S. innovation. It begins with
businesses that start in garages or basements, produce
Kickstarter campaigns, and are wooed by Silicon Valley venture
capitalists. Entrepreneurs and small businesses such as these
drive our economy and shape our future. For example, evidence
suggests that small businesses are more likely to create new and
exciting technological breakthroughs.2  Unfortunately, the
economic environment for small businesses has been
unpredictable in recent years.
Despite the fact that there is some recent evidence of
recovery,3 in the last several years, the U.S. economy has
struggled. In January of 2010, several economic experts
predicted that the U.S. economy would not experience a "robust
and sustained expansion."4  A little over a month into 2010,
1 Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Address Before a Joint Session of
Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 24, 2012), available at http://www.white
house.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/24/remarks-president-state-union-address.
2 OFFICE OF ADvOCACY, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., THE SMALL BUSINESS
ECONOMY: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 191 (2005) [hereinafter THE SMALL
BUSINESS ECONOMY: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT], available at http://www.sba.gov/
sites/default/files/files/sbecon2005.pdf.
3 Catherine Rampell, Consumers Help Drive U.S. Economy to 3.2% Growth
Rate, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2010, at B1 (reporting that the U.S. economy has expanded
for three quarters in a row but that hiring continues to lag).
4 Pedro Nicolaci da Costa, U.S. Growth Prospects Deemed Bleak in New Decade,
REUTERS (Jan. 3, 2010, 6:55 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6021LK
20100103 (predicting that U.S. gross domestic product would expand less than two
percent over the next ten years).
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sixteen banks failed.5  Housing-industry professionals opined
that foreclosures and a drop in housing prices would continue
through the first half of 2010.6 In February of 2010, as the short-
term outlook on jobs worsened, consumer confidence dropped to a
ten-month low.7
The outlook for small business owners was also bleak for
2010.8 Small businesses continued to reduce their workforce.' In
addition, a report indicated that small businesses continued to
cut their capital spending.1" These facts led one author to opine
that small businesses were becoming "the Achilles' heel of the
U.S. recovery."1
The economic environment in the United States continues to
experience slow growth. In 2013, the New York Times reported
that the economy was forecasted to grow 2.4% to 3.0%.12 The
newspaper's forecast was on the heels of the economy barely
growing the last quarter of 2012.1 The Congressional Budget
Office also predicted that economic growth would remain slow. 4
Consequently, the slow growth would prevent businesses from
hiring American workers, causing the unemployment rate to
Julianne Pepitone, 2010 Bank Failure Tally Now 16, CNNMONEY (Feb. 8,
2010, 4:27 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/05/news/economy/bank-failures/
index.htm.
6 Janet Morrissey, Still Hunting for a Bottom in Housing, TIME (Jan. 7, 2010),
http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1952132,00.html (indicating,
however, that there have been mixed signs of stabilization in the housing market).
Leah Schnurr, Wall Street Drops Along with Consumer Confidence, REUTERS
(Feb. 23, 2010, 5:01 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61L23U20100223.
' Dark Clouds Hang over U.S. Small Business: Survey, REUTERS (Feb. 9, 2010,
8:30 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6141SR20100209 (stating that
the clouds hovering over small businesses since the recession that began at the end
of 2007 has gotten the attention of Washington).
9 Michael McKee, In This Recovery, Small Business Falls Behind, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/
10_08/b4167016988043.htm (arguing that small businesses have been reluctant to
invest in jobs, which is the area in which the economy needs the most assistance).
'o See id.
1' See id.
12 Catherine Rampell, U.S. Economy Expanded Slightly in 4th Quarter, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 1, 2013, at B3 (explaining that the data is basically indistinguishable
from no economic growth at all and predicting that if Congress does not avert
spending cuts, economic growth will decline).
"3 See id.
14 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL
YEARS 2013 TO 2023, at 1, 4 (2013), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/attachments/43907-BudgetOutlook.pdf (anticipating that economic growth
will remain slow in 2013).
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remain near eight percent. 15  Recently, some commentators
suggested that the congressional budget battle and government
shutdown in 2013 also harmed small businesses. 6 In sum, small
businesses have experienced a very murky economic climate in
the past several years.
The news concerning small businesses is especially troubling
because companies with fewer than five hundred employees have
helped lead the economy out of the last four recessions. 7 Many
believe that small businesses are key drivers of technological
innovation, which in turn leads to more job creation. 8
Accordingly, many experts have taken an increasing interest in
ways to assist small businesses in their technological pursuits
through reforming the U.S. patent system.19 Some commentators
believe that making key changes to the U.S. patent system will
assist small businesses to innovate, which in turn will positively
impact the economy.2 °
Within the U.S. patent system, small businesses, which may
qualify for small entity status-also referred to as "SMEs" (small
and medium enterprises)-face their own unique set of
challenges. In July of 2010, Professor Scott Shane reported that
small entities accounted for a decreasing share of U.S. patents as
compared to large entities-for-profit businesses with greater
than five hundred employees.2' This decline may have been due
in part to factors detailed in a 2008 study that said that start-up
executives believed that the patent system was just "muddling
15 See id. at 4.
16 See Joyce M. Rosenberg, What's Ahead for Small Businesses in 2014?,
NEWSDAY (Jan. 26, 2014, 4:10 PM), http://www.newsday.com/business/what-s-ahead-
for-small-businesses-in-2014-1.6844044.
17 McKee, supra note 9.
18 ARTI RAI ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PATENT REFORM: UNLEASHING
INNOVATION, PROMOTING ECONOMIC GROWTH & PRODUCING HIGH-PAYING JOBS 2
(2010), available at http'//www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/documents/migrated/
PatentReform-paper.pdf.
19 See id. at 1, 6-7.
20 See id. at 1, 6.
21 Scott Shane, Patents Granted to Small Entities in Decline, SMALL BUSINESS
TRENDS (July 19, 2010), http://smallbiztrends.com/2010/07/how-smart-is-the-
average-entrepreneur.html (lamenting that the trend is probably worse than the
figures show because the USPTO classifies universities and non-profits as small
entities and concluding that the small entity numbers overstate the share of patents
being assigned to small firms).
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through."22  In addition, the study revealed that the cost of
obtaining a patent was a major obstacle to small businesses
seeking to patent inventions.2" Further, it was revealed that the
motivation for small entities to obtain a patent may be different
from that of large entities. Specifically, the study contended that
small entities may seek patents primarily to: (1) prevent copying;
(2) attract investment; and (3) enhance their reputation.24
Generally, there are two overarching concerns with respect
to the patent process. First, patent stakeholders are interested
in the quality of the examination. To address perceived
deficiencies in quality, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
("AIA") called for the implementation of several examination
procedures such as Post Grant Review. Since these procedures
only recently took effect, there is still not enough data to
determine whether they will be effective. Second, patent
stakeholders are interested in the speed of patent examination.
Currently, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO")
offers several ways in which applicants can attempt to speed up
the examination of their patent application. Commentators have
given these programs mixed reviews.
One major change to U.S. patent law that could have a huge
effect on small entities is the transition to a "first-to-file" system
in the United States. The "first-to-file" system means that a
patent's priority date can no longer be based on the day of
invention. Instead, priority is based on when a patent
application is filed. In a recent article, David S. Abrams and R.
Polk Wagner argue that the "first-to-file" system will have a
negative impact on individual inventors.25 Specifically, Abrams
and Wagner explain that a similar change in the law in Canada
led to a fourteen percent drop in patents granted to individual
22 See Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent
System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255,
1324 (2009).
23 Id. at 1310, 1312.
24 Id. at 1297-98.
25 See David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple? The
America Invents Act and Individual Inventors, 65 STAN. L. REV. 517, 517-18 (2013)
(concluding that the change to "first-to-file" in the United States will result in a
reduction of patents granted to individual inventors based on empirical data from
Canada's change to a "first-to-file" system where there was a significant drop in the
number of patents granted to individual inventors).
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inventors.26 While it is too early in the process to accurately
observe the impact in the United States, Abrams and Wagner's
work raises interesting questions about the new patenting
process.27
The patent process is simply different for small entities.
While numerous patent reform proposals and programs have
been implemented recently, none directly address the reason why
small entities patent or the unique challenges faced by small
entities.28 Instead of sweeping proposals that could have a
disparate impact on small entities, narrow and direct proposals
are needed that will specifically address as many of the concerns
of small entities as possible while maintaining or increasing
patent quality.
Accordingly, this Article suggests that the USPTO
implement a Small Entity Prioritized Examination ("SEPE")
program that would accelerate the patenting process for small
business inventors. As detailed below, the proposed SEPE
program addresses obstacles within the U.S. patent system that
hamper small entities. Further, given the proposal's framework,
the USPTO could implement the proposed SEPE program with
relative ease. This Article also suggests a way in which the
USPTO could evaluate the effectiveness of the SEPE program, or
any special examination program, by using publicly available
data in conjunction with a patent valuation model. The goal of
the SEPE program and the valuation model is to provide small
entities with the opportunity and data to take advantage of the
U.S. patenting process.
Few scholars have considered the impact of a now defunct
special status the USPTO granted to small entity applicants
solely in the biotechnology field. A small entity wishing to obtain
special status under this program had to show that the subject
invention was a major asset and that the entity's development of
the technology would be impaired if there was delay in having
26 See id. at 522 (explaining that, once the change in Canadian law is isolated,
the authors observe a fourteen percent drop in the number of applications that were
granted to small inventors in Canada).
27 The United States transitioned to the first inventor-to-file system on March
16, 2013.
28 See infra Part II.
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the application examined.29 The ability to acquire this special
status ended without much discussion or debate outside the
USPTO. Given the economic climate and the importance of small
entities, this Article argues for a broader version of this program
to be revived. Further, this Article suggests using a patent
valuation model to evaluate the effectiveness of this and similar
programs.
Despite evidence that small entities make a significant
contribution to U.S. innovation, there seem to be very few
policies put in place to support them. Historically,
commentators' proposals for reforms suggesting improvement in
patent quality and examination speed have been critically flawed
or fallen on deaf ears. The AIA is considered the most significant
patent legislation in fifty years. However, the AIA does very
little to promote small entities directly. Moreover, the special
examination programs implemented by the USPTO also do little
to address small entity patenting concerns.
Policymakers and commentators have put forward several
proposals for patent reform to address many issues. There are so
many in the literature that this Article cannot do them all
justice. Instead, this Article focuses on proposals that have been
put forth to solve the specific problems of patent quality and the
speed of examination." Generally, with respect to speed, the
proposals discussed here seek to shorten the time it takes a
patentee to obtain some patent right by significantly modifying
the patent process. Similarly, many of the proposals that are
directed toward quality suggest modifying the current
examination procedure in significant ways. While these
proposals are interesting, this Article avoids endorsing them or
making similar proposals. Instead, this Article suggests small,
incremental changes that can be added to the programs the
USPTO has already implemented.
While several accelerated examination programs currently
exist, none can be used exclusively by small entities. Instead, the
programs are available to small and large entities. They are
divided up by other requirements such as subject matter. In
addition, some of the programs require the applicant to do a lot of
29 See PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 708.02(XII) (8th ed. rev. 1, Feb. 2003), available
at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/old/E8Rl-7OO.pdf.
30 See infra Part II.
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the examination legwork upfront-that is, find prior art, and so
forth. 1 While these programs are meant to address the desire of
some applicants for a faster examination, this Article argues that
the programs do very little to encourage small entity patenting.
The proposed examination program for small entities
attempts to address small entity challenges head on. 32 First, it
provides small entities with an exclusive patent examination
track with the goal of speeding up examination. Second, the
proposed program is friendly to new applicants by limiting the
number of times an applicant can use the program. Third, in
contrast to other examination programs, the proposed program
does not require additional information from the applicant.
Finally, this Article suggests a patent valuation model for
monitoring patents acquired under the proposed program.3 The
valuation model could provide valuable feedback to USPTO
stakeholders regarding the effectiveness of special examination
programs and provide further insight into small entity patenting
behavior.
Part I of this Article discusses the current state of the U.S.
patent system and reviews some of the challenges entrepreneurs
and small entities face regarding patenting their inventions.
Part II reviews some patent reform proposals and existing
programs and discusses their impact on small entities. Part III
highlights the current USPTO examination programs and
discusses the effectiveness of the various programs. Part IV sets
forth the proposed program, prioritizing a select number of
patent applications where the inventor is an entrepreneur or
small entity. The Article concludes in Part V, which suggests
how patent stakeholders, including the USPTO, may use a
valuation model to evaluate the long-term effectiveness of special
patent prosecution initiatives that offer patentees a faster path
to obtaining a patent.
It remains an open question whether allowing patentees a
faster way to obtain patents is beneficial to the overall economy.
However, there is evidence that for some entrepreneurs and
small businesses, obtaining patents at an early stage may be
beneficial to their long-term growth and competiveness.
Specifically, under the prospect theory of the patent system,
31 See infra Part III.
32 See infra Part IV.
3 See infra Part V.
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patenting provides small entities with the ability to exclude
competitors from a particular market while they perfect and
commercialize their products. 4 Since small entities typically
create and patent transformational products, it follows that U.S.
innovation policy should remove barriers to patenting for small
entities. One small way to do that may be to help small entities
obtain patents quicker. However, in conjunction with speeding
up the process, U.S. innovation policy makers should also create
a framework for measuring the effectiveness of such programs so
that U.S. innovation policy can continue to have a real impact on
the U.S. economy.
I. SMALL ENTITIES AND THE U.S. PATENT SYSTEM
A. The U.S. Patent System
In the United States, the USPTO is the federal agency with
the authority to grant patents and register trademarks. Chris
Katopis has referred to the Patent Office as "a gatekeeper for the
public's storehouse of knowledge and the nation's economic
investment."36  In this capacity, the USPTO examines patent
applications and grants patents in accordance with the
requirements of the Patent Act. 7 Naturally, the USPTO has a
number of supporters and detractors. The most common
complaints leveled against the patent office relate to: (1) the
application backlog; (2) patent quality; (3) the cost; and
(4) internal administrative matters such as technology
infrastructure or employee morale.3
According to the USPTO's Data Visualization Center, as of
September 2014, it takes the-USPTO about eighteen to nineteen
months from the date an application is filed to issue a first office
action.39 The average total pendency for an application is 27.4
34 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L.
& ECON. 265, 276 (1977).
15 The USPTO: Who We Are, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/about/ (last modified July 8, 2014).
"' Chris J. Katopis, Perfect Happiness?: Game Theory as a Tool for Enhancing
Patent Quality, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 360, 365 (2008) (footnote omitted).
" See id.
31 See id. at 369.
39 See Data Visualization Center, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Sept. 2014),
http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml.
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months as of September 2014.40 Total pendency is "the average
number of months from the patent application filing date to the
date the application has reached final disposition"-for example,
issued as a patent or abandoned.41 Professor Kristen Osenga
notes that reported patent office statistics may fail to take the
discrepancies in pendency times between various technologies
into account.42 Anecdotal reports indicate that "the time period
from filing to issuance varies by technology and ranges from
twenty-four to thirty-six months for chemical and mechanical
arts and thirty-six to sixty months for electrical and software
arts."43
In addition to delay, poor patent quality is considered a
longstanding problem for the USPTO. 44 Low-quality patents are
often obvious, overly broad, or unclear.4  Further, low-quality
patents hinder innovation because they can be profitably
asserted against alleged infringers. 46  Litigation of this type
increases costs for genuine innovators because, if sued, they must
defend themselves against infringement suits based on low-
quality patents.4
Another criticism of the U.S. patent system is that it is
expensive to obtain a patent.48 One commentator has estimated
that the annual cost of patent prosecution in the United States is
over four billion dollars.49  Respondents in a recent study
reported that it cost them more than thirty-eight thousand
dollars to acquire their most recent patent.5 0 This estimate most
likely includes USPTO application and filing fees, as well as
attorney's fees to prepare and file the application, response to
office actions, and continued prosecution to issuance or
40 See id.
"' See id.
42 See Kristen Osenga, Entrance Ramps, Tolls, and Express Lanes-Proposals
for Decreasing Traffic Congestion in the Patent Office, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 119,
129-30 (2005).
43 Id. at 130.
44 See Katopis, supra note 36, at 390.
45 See RAI ETAL., supra note 18, at 5.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95
NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2001).
49 Id. at 1499.
50 Graham et al., supra note 22, at 1311.
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abandonment of the application.51 These obstacles exist for
anyone seeking a patent and are only magnified for smaller
entities.
To address some of the issues, Congress recently crafted
legislation that is considered the most significant change in
patent law since 1952.52 On September 16, 2011, President
Obama signed into law the AIA. 53 While one goal of the AIA is to
increase the speed and quality of patent examinations, one
commentator has suggested that the law will have a negative
impact on small entities.54 This is in part due to the fact that
small entities face unique challenges in the patenting process.55
B. The Patenting Behavior of Small Entities
Under 37 C.F.R. § 1.27, a small entity is defined as a
person-for example, an inventor or individual to whom an
inventor has transferred some rights in the invention-a small
business concern, or nonprofit organization.56 A small business
concern is defined as a firm "[w]hose number of employees,
including affiliates, does not exceed 500 persons" and which has
not assigned any rights in the invention to a person or concern
that could not be qualified as an independent inventor, small
entity, or nonprofit organization.5 7  Examples of nonprofits
include educational institutions and 501(c)(3) organizations." In
recognition of the unique challenges they face, small entities can
take advantage of reduced patent fees.59 It is likely that the fee
reduction is also recognition for the unique and important role
small entities play in the U.S. economy. °
Small entities and large companies contribute to this
country's innovation economy in different ways. A chapter in the
report titled "Small Firms: Why Market-Driven Innovation Can't
51 Lemley, supra note 48, at 1499.
" Hung H. Bui, An Overview of Patent Reform Act of 2011: Navigating the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Including Effective Dates for Patent Reform, 93 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 441, 445 (2011).
11 Id. at 441.
14 Abrams & Wagner, supra note 25, at 521.
" See id. at 520.
56 37 C.F.R. § 1.27(a)(1) (2014).
57 13 C.F.R. § 121.802.
58 37 C.F.R. § 1.27(a)(3)(ii)(A)-(B).
59 35 U.S.C. § 41(h)(1) (2012).
60 THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 2,
at 184-87, 201-04.
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Get Along Without Them," asserts that "small enterprises have
made and continue to make a critical contribution to the market
economies' unprecedented growth and innovation
accomplishments."61 To emphasize the importance of small
entities, the author of the report, Professor William J. Baumol,
divides inventions into two categories: revolutionary
breakthroughs and cumulative incremental improvements.62
Large businesses are not typically responsible for
technological breakthroughs. Professor Baumol argues that even
though large business enterprises contribute to the bulk of
research and development spending, 63 they "tend to specialize in
the incremental improvements and tend to avoid the risks of the
unknown that the revolutionary breakthrough entails. 64
Specifically, Baumol states that large businesses focus on
"product improvement, increased reliability and enhanced user
friendliness of products and the finding of new uses for those
products. 65  Accordingly, large businesses tend to be best at
improving upon a technology once it has been discovered or
invented.
In contrast, small businesses tend to be better at making
technological discoveries or inventing new technologies.
Professor Baumol asserts that "among the (rare) innovations that
can be considered to be radical, a disproportionate share is
provided by independent innovators and their affiliated
entrepreneurs."66  For example, small businesses were
responsible for several revolutionary breakthroughs in the
twentieth century, including soft contact lenses, the
microprocessor, and the zipper.67 Professor Baumol also notes
that, according to a study sponsored by the U.S. Small Business
Administration, Office of Advocacy, small firms are more likely to
own patents that are among the top one percent of the most
61 Id. at 183.
62 Id. at 184.
63 Id. at 187.
6 Id. at 185.
65 Id. at 188 (stating that between 1971 and 2003, for example, the clock speed
of Intel's chips increased three million percent).
66 Id. at 191.
67 Id. at 185-86.
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frequently cited patents than large firms.68  Because of such
accomplishments, one may conclude that entrepreneurs are an
indispensible component of the engine of economic growth.69
Despite evidence that small entities benefit U.S. innovation,
a limited amount of assistance is available to inventors with
respect to the patenting process.7" Perhaps one reason is that a
definitive causal link has not been established between patenting
and innovation. This question is beyond the scope of this Article.
Instead, this Article presumes that small entity patenting
activity is at least one positive indicator of innovation.
Accordingly, the next Section explores whether current USPTO
programs align with the challenges small entities face.
C. The Patenting Challenges for Small Entities
1. Patenting Decline
Recently, much has been written about the relationship
between the U.S. patent system and small entities.7 In late
2009, the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology published its
findings ("the Berkeley Study") based on a survey conducted of
high-technology startup firms in the United States to determine
how these companies use and are affected by the patent system.72
According to the Berkeley Study, startup executives believe that
the patent system is just "muddling through."73 In July of 2010,
Professor Scott Shane reported that small entities were
accounting for a decreasing share of U.S. patents.74 Specifically,
the share of patents granted to small entities dropped from thirty
percent in 1995 to twenty percent in 2009.75 Shane pointed out
that the share of patents granted to small entities that were also
68 Id. at 185; CHI RESEARCH INC., SMALL SERIAL INNOVATORS: THE SMALL FIRM
CONTRIBUTION TO TECHNICAL CHANGE 12 (2003), available at http://archive.sba.gov/
advo/research/rs225tot.pdf.
69 THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 2,
at 201.
70 See Inventors Assistance Center (IAC), U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/inventors/iac/index'jsp (last modified July 27, 2012)
(summarizing public services provided by the USPTO to assist inventors).
71 See, e.g., RAI ET AL., supra note 18, at 7; Graham et al., supra note 22, at 1258;
Shane, supra note 21.
72 Graham et al., supra note 22, at 1255, 1260.
73 Id. at 1324.
14 Shane, supra note 21.
75 Id.
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U.S. citizens declined from thirty-five percent in 2001 to twenty-
eight percent in 2009.76 Shane concluded that the decline in the
number of patents granted to small entities should be a concern
for anyone that views small businesses as important to
technological innovation. 7
Several commentators have argued that there is a
correlation between patenting, innovation, and a strong economy.
In April of 2010, the U.S. Department of Commerce published a
White Paper, titled "Patent Reform: Unleashing Innovation,
Promoting Economic Growth & Producing High-Paying Jobs"
("the White Paper"). 8  The White Paper asserts that
technological innovation is key to stimulating economic growth-
including jobs-and that innovation depends significantly on the
ability of innovators to obtain patents.7 9 For example, between
1990 and 2007, compensation per employee increased fifty
percent in some of the most innovative industries such as
computers, electronics, and chemicals.8 0  Thus, one might
conclude that the ability of small entities to acquire patents has a
direct impact on the U.S. economy.
Small entities that are backed by venture capital can be
significantly impacted by patent policy. Venture-backed firms
are disproportionately responsible for innovative output in the
economy."' Patents play a key role to innovators in these fields
when developing their business plans and attempting to attract
investors such as venture capitalists, as well as research and
development initiatives.82 Many venture capitalists consider
patents important to their funding decisions. 3 "For example, in
a large-scale survey conducted in 2008, 76% of startup managers
reported that [venture capital] investors consider patents
important to funding decisions."8 4 Venture capital funding can
assist a small entity by providing capital that will allow it to
potentially commercialize innovative products.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 RAI ET AL., supra note 18, at 1.
79 See id. at 2-3.
so Id. at 3.
81 Graham et al., supra note 22, at 1270.
82 RAI ET AL., supra note 18, at 2-3.
8 Id. at 3.
84 Id.
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Accordingly, reports suggest that small entities such as high-
technology startups rely heavily on investment from venture
capitalists.85 Some evidence also indicates that venture capital
investors are less willing to fund companies that hold no
patents.8 6 Particularly in the biotechnology field, it is important
for a young company to have patents with broad claims.8 7 Thus,
patents play a significant role in technology entrepreneurship
even though some executives interviewed by the Berkeley Study
believed that patents provided a relatively weak incentive to
innovate.8 8  Indeed, the Berkeley Study found that patents
supported several key startup activities, including "securing the
necessary investment to develop and grow; increasing the odds
and quality of a liquidity event, such as an acquisition or IPO;
and serving strategic roles in negotiation and defending against
patent infringement suits." 9 Thus, patents that are timely and
are of high quality will drive innovation; delay, uncertainty, poor
quality, and inefficiencies in legal processes will stymie
innovation. Unfortunately, some available data suggests that
the current patent system fails to provide timely and high-
quality patents in a consistent fashion.9
2. Patenting Roadblocks
The cost of acquiring a patent can be a major roadblock for
small entities. Among technology startups, the cost of obtaining
a patent is the most common reason cited for not patenting a
major technology. 2 Respondents in the Berkeley Study reported
that it cost them more than thirty-eight thousand dollars to
acquire their most recent patent.93 An executive interviewed
during the Berkeley Study stated:
[S]tartups often pay significantly more than incumbents to their
prosecuting attorneys, because startups (1) tend to file for
patents on inventions that are more important to the company's
'5 John B. Maier, II & David A. Walker, The Role of Venture Capital in
Financing Small Business, 2 J. Bus. VENTURING 207, 208 (1987).
86 Graham et al., supra note 22, at 1280.
17 See id.
88 See id. at 1287.
89 See id.
90 RAIET AL., supra note 18, at 2.
91 Id. at 4.
92 Graham et al., supra note 22, at 1310.
91 See id. at 1311.
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core business model than large firms; (2) usually use outside
instead of in-house counsel for patent prosecution; and (3) often
have difficulty monitoring outside counsel to limit overall
costs.
94
In addition to cost, delay in receiving a patent also causes
problems for startups, particularly those seeking financing.95 As
of September 2014, the USPTO estimates that there is an
application backlog of approximately 605,646 applications. 96
Patent delay also causes problems for potential competitors who
must wait to tailor their research and development until they
know what claims have been granted to an applicant.9"
Moreover, delay is an especially troublesome problem in areas
with rapid technology turnover or short product life cycles such
as software because delayed patents in these areas have the
potential to become obsolete or worthless very quickly.98
Obtaining and maintaining a quality patent is another
challenge small entities face. The USPTO considers low-quality
patents to be those that are obvious, overly broad, or unclear.99
Low-quality patents hinder innovation due to the high cost
incurred by others to defend against an assertion of patent
infringement or licensing of a low-quality patent that may be
invalid. 00 Moreover, low-quality patents discourage investment
in innovation and harm the overall economy.01
Finally, statistics show that the odds of an applicant
acquiring and maintaining a patent are low.10 2 On average, sixty
to sixty-five percent of applications ultimately result in a patent
being issued. 03 Further, once a patent is issued, there is a
significant chance it will not be enforceable for its full legal term.
"In fact, nearly half of all patents are abandoned for failure to
9' Id. at 1311-12.
5 RAI ET AL., supra note 18, at 5.
96 See Data Visualization Center, supra note 39.
97 See RAI ET AL., supra note 18, at 5.
98 See id. at 6.
99 See id. at 5.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 4 (arguing that low-quality patents "undermine the potential for
economic growth and job creation").
102 See Irene Troy & Raymund Werle, Uncertainty and the Market for Patents 14
(Max Planck Inst. for the Study of Soc'ys, MPIfG Working Paper No. 08/2, 2008),
available at http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp08-2.pdf.
103 Lemley, supra note 48.
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pay maintenance fees before the patent term is half over, and
two-thirds of all patents lapse in this way before the end of their
term.', 4
So why do cash-strapped startups agree to participate in a
system with odds of success that have been compared to a
lottery? A traditional rationale for seeking a patent is to obtain
rights that: (1) exclude competitors from a market, or (2) can be
used to obtain licensing revenue in exchange for authorized use
of patented technology. 105 Respondents to the Berkeley Study
reported that preventing others from copying their products and
services was the most important reason for patenting. 10 6
However, companies also seek patent protection for several
reasons that are unrelated to the rights afforded by a patent
monopoly. 0 7 For some companies, patents are a shield against
other infringement lawsuits. 08 A company's patents may also
signal that the company possesses certain desirable attributes.'0 9
For example, venture capitalists use client patents-or more
likely, patent applications-as evidence that the company is well
managed, is at a certain stage in development, and has defined
and carved out a market niche. 10 In contrast, "[e]stablished
companies may patent out of inertia, to maintain a reputation as
a market leader, or simply for the marquee value of selling a
product with 'patented technology.' ""' According to the Berkeley
Study, aside from preventing copying, (1) improving chances of
securing investment, (2) improving chances and quality of a
liquidity event, and (3) enhancing company reputation and
product image were second in importance to respondents."
Accordingly, patents may signal valuable information about a
company to potential investors.
104 Osenga, supra note 42, at 125.
10I Lemley, supra note 48, at 1500-01.
106 Graham et al., supra note 22, at 1297.
107 Ann Bartow, Separating Marketing Innovation from Actual Invention: A
Proposal for a New, Improved, Lighter, and Better-Tasting Form of Patent Protection,
4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 1, 8-9 (2000).
100 Lemley, supra note 48, at 1504.
oI See generally Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002).
"0 Lemley, supra note 48, at 1505-06.
111 Id. at 1506.
112 See id.
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The perceived rationale for patenting has a direct effect on
reform proposals put forth by policy makers.113 Pro-patent policy
makers that believe patents stimulate innovation are in favor of
immediate and strong patent protection. 114 In contrast, policy
makers who may believe that patents harm competition and the
free market are in favor of limiting the cost and the burden of
patents on the public by affording patents a minimum amount of
protection. 115  New reforms introduced in the AIA seem to
balance these concerns.
To address delay, uncertainty, poor quality, and inefficiency
within the patent system, the AIA implements two reforms for
increasing the quality and timeliness of patents." 6  The first
reform grants the USPTO the authority to flexibly adjust its fees
instead of relying on congressional authority to amend its fee
schedules." 7  Accordingly, the USPTO has the ability to raise
fees to pay for technology and additional examiners that the
patent office would then use to reduce the 605,646 application
backlog. 118
The second reform is the introduction of an enhanced post-
grant review process, which the White Paper asserts will reduce
the cost of patent disputes."9  Challenging the validity of a
patent can also be cost prohibitive for a small entity. 20 Post-
grant review is expected to cost significantly less than litigation;
under the proposed reform, post-grant review would be resolved
in one year.12 ' According to the most recent statistics made
available by the USPTO in early 2014, only one petition for post-
grant review has been filed and then was later terminated. 1
2
113 See Sean A. Pager, Patents on a Shoestring: Making Patent Protection Work
for Developing Countries, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 755, 762 (2007).
114 Id. at 762-63.
115 Id.
116 RAI ET AL., supra note 18, at 6.
117 See id.
ll See id. at 6-7.
119 See id. at 7.
120 See id.
121 See id. at 8.
122 See ALA Trial Proceedings, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.us
pto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/stats/aia trial-proceedings.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2014)
(showing data for AIA Trial Proceedings for fiscal years 2012 and 2013).
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As is discussed in this Article, these proposals are two of
several that have been put forth to solve the perceived problems
with the patent system. 123 A common theme among the proposals
discussed herein is attempting to shorten the pendency of
applications while maintaining or increasing the quality of the
examination. 124 While we will see that some proposals are more
workable than others, none seem to directly address the unique
problems of small entities.125 Ignoring problems unique to small
entities could continue to stagnate small entity patent filings,
which could have a negative effect on innovation and the U.S.
economy.
II. A SURVEY OF PATENT REFORM PROPOSALS
This Part discusses various patent reform proposals that
have been proposed throughout the literature. These proposals
attempt to address concerns over improving the quality of
patents and saving time and cost in acquiring patents. 26 In
addition, this Part discusses the three-track system recently
proposed by the USPTO and the existing prioritized examination
programs now being implemented by the USPTO. 127 This Part
provides criticisms for the various proposals and, where
appropriate, analyzes the proposals' impact on small entities.
A. Proposals for Increasing Patent Quality
1. A Commercialization Requirement
The idea of "commercialization" refers to a patentee that
manufactures or sells a product that embodies an invention
disclosed in the patentee's patent. Currently, applicants do not
have to commercialize their invention in order to obtain a
patent. 128 However, several commentators have suggested that
some sort of commercialization requirement for patent
applications should be implemented and that it would increase
patent quality. 129 For example, Professors Michael Abramowicz
123 See infra Part II.
124 See id.
125 See id.
126 See infra Part II.A-B.
127 See infra Part II.B.
12 Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 355 (2010).
129 This proposal is interesting especially given the popularity of non-practicing
entities, which generally do not commercialize their patents.
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and John Duffy have proposed reviving the paper-patent
doctrine. 130 Under this doctrine, the validity-bar is raised for
patents that go uncommercialized. 131' Another proposal suggests
imposing a requirement that the applicants commercialize their
invention or forfeit their rights in the patent. 132 According to
another commentator's proposal, a "commercialization" patent
would possess claims limited to the product specifically disclosed
in its specification and the invention would need to be practiced
no later than three years after filing the application. 133
However, there are several objections to a commercialization
requirement. Requiring patents to be commercialized is at odds
with the core principles of the current U.S. patent system.
Imposing a commercialization requirement "would effectively
return patent law to the pre-1880 practice of submitting a
working model to obtain a patent.' 1 4  Further, a
commercialization requirement "could significantly diminish ex
ante incentives to invent and could lead to duplicated
development costs."'35  Moreover, requiring a patent to be
commercialized could significantly affect various patentees in
disparate ways.
For example, critics of commercialization requirements have
speculated that such a requirement would have a disparate
impact on small entities. 3 6 Small entities "tend to have much
smaller R & D budgets than large companies."1 37 Thus, requiring
commercialization of the invention that is the subject of a patent
application may unduly burden the small entity.3 8 Further, "[i]f,
as some commentators have contended, smaller companies
innovate more per R & D dollar than large ones, actual reduction
to practice could reduce overall innovation." 39 Accordingly, there
are strong arguments that the cost of imposing a
commercialization requirement would not outweigh the benefits.
130 Sichelman, supra note 128, at 391.
131 Id. at 391-92.
132 See id. at 394.
133 See id. at 346.
134 Id. at 392-93.
131 Id. at 345.
136 See id. at 393.
137 Id.
"I See id. at 393-94.
139 Id.
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2. Enhanced Examination
Some policy makers argue that the way to increase patent
quality is by enhancing aspects of the application examination
process. Several proposals in the literature are based on the
premise that if the Examiner reviews more prior art, then the
quality of her examination will be higher.140 One commentator
has proposed that the price of examination should vary based on
the prior art references considered and argued by the
Examiner. 141 The higher the fee paid, the more extensive the
search performed by the Examiner.12 Under this proposal, the
patentee could pay additional fees to submit additional
references with a statement of relevance in order to have those
references considered by the Examiner."" Under this fee-based
proposal, one might argue that the quality of the resultant patent
may well rely on how much money an applicant was willing to
spend to have the application examined. Further, there is little
evidence, empirical or anecdotal, that the number of references
considered by an Examiner increases the quality of a resultant
patent. 4 4
Nevertheless, recent changes to patent law have made it
easier for interested parties to submit prior art that they think is
relevant to the Examiner. Specifically, the AIA modified the
existing third-party pre-issuance submission rules to make it
easier for a third party to submit prior art to the Examiner of
another application. 45  Such a proposal lends itself to the
argument that only those applications that have attracted
interest from third parties will receive quality examination.
Further, it is unclear how effective this proposal would be in
practice since many sophisticated entities refrain from regularly
reading patents and applications. 46
140 Michael Meehan, Increasing Certainty and Harnessing Private Information
in the U.S. Patent System: A Proposal for Reform, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, $ 30
(2010).
141 See id. 35.
142 See id.
143 See id.
'4 Osenga, supra note 42, at 146-47.
145 David W. Trilling, Recent Development, Recognizing a Need for Reform: The
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, 2012 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POLY 239, 248-
49 (2012).
146 See id. at 248.
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Accordingly, it is not clear that a proposal focused on
increasing the number of references viewed by the Examiner
would have a positive impact on the patenting of small entities.
A variable fee-based system presents several cost challenges. 147
Some of the challenges a variable fee-based system would present
to small entities is discussed below in regards to the three-track
proposal and accelerated examination.148 Further, larger entities
could take advantage of the third-party pre-issuance submission
system to overburden examiners and slow prosecution of small
entity patents. So, while a patent granted to a small entity
under an enhanced examination procedure may improve patent
quality overall, it is unclear if such a procedure will decrease the
examination time of an application or if it will enhance a small
entity's chances of securing investment.
B. Proposals for Reducing the Time or Cost Incurred To Obtain
a Patent
1. Registration and Hybrid Examination
Some commentators believe that instituting a patent
registration system or some form of hybrid registration system
will reduce the time and cost of obtaining patent rights. In
general, the goal of patent registration and hybrid examination
proposals is to allow an applicant to register some form of
pseudo-invention disclosure while affording the applicant the
option to delay substantive examination until a later date.1 49
Theoretically, this system reduces the time and cost it would take
for the applicant to acquire some form of recognized right.150 For
example, one commentator has suggested that the United States
adopt a registration system where patents are reviewed solely for
compliance with procedural formalities, and determinations of
validity only occur later if an infringement claim is brought.1 5 ' In
the alternative, a similar proposal allows the patentee to request
147 Letter from Susan Walthall, Acting Chief Counsel, Office of Advocacy & Kate
Reichert, Assistant Chief Counsel, Office of Advocacy, to Robert A. Clarke, Deputy
Dir., Office of Patent Legal Admin. (Aug. 20, 2010) [hereinafter Letter from Susan
Walthall], available at http://www.sba.gov/content/letter-dated-082010-department-
commerce-patent-and-trademark-office- 1.
148 Id.
149 See Lemley, supra note 48, at 1527.
150 See id. at 1526-27.
151 Pager, supra note 113, at 771.
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an examination any time after the invention is registered.152 One
proposal recommends a mechanism called a "primary patent"
where an application would receive minimal examination and be
granted as a patent but could not be enforced through
litigation.153 Instead, the primary patent could later be subject to
examination in anticipation of licensing or litigation."'
Granting some form of preliminary rights and delaying
substantive examination could cause several problems. First, a
potential patentee could threaten others with litigation based on
incredibly broad and unexamined claims. 5 5 Second, a patent of
this type would fail to put the public on notice of the subject
matter claimed by the applicant. Third, it is unlikely that
temporary injunctive relief could be quickly obtained by one
asserting a registration patent in litigation. Thus, while a
registration/hybrid examination system would allow an applicant
to obtain some sort of official recognition quickly, such a system
sacrifices quality and places the burden of ensuring quality
patents primarily on enforcement mechanisms. Because of this
high social cost, one can conclude that registering potentially
invalid patents is not worth the benefits provided by the low
barrier to entry.'56
It is likely that small entities would also be negatively
affected by a registration/hybrid examination system. It is
unclear whether a registration patent would prevent competitors
from copying a product, since it would be unclear what is exactly
covered by the registration patent. Further, business ventures
resting on untested patents may have difficulty finding willing
investors.'57 Finally, it is unlikely a registration patent would do
much to enhance a company's image since in most cases a
registration application does not initially undergo substantive
examination. 158
152 Lemley, supra note 48, at 1524, 1527.
113 Osenga, supra note 42, at 141-42.
154 See id.
155 Pager, supra note 113, at 771.
156 Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 577, 594-95 (1999).
157 Pager, supra note 113, at 771.
158 Id.
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2. Petty and Second Tier Patents
In order to reduce the time and expense associated with
obtaining a patent, several commentators have suggested
imposing some sort of petty patent or second tier patenting
system in the United States. 159 One common argument in favor
of this proposal is that similar second tier protection is available
in more than sixty countries. 160  For example, Australia offers
applicants the ability to file what is called an Innovation
Patent.16 Petty patents are usually granted under a "relaxed
obviousness standard," are shorter in term-five to eight years-
and may be granted after a very brief examination. 62  One
commentator has remarked that a benefit of second tier patents
is that they could potentially reduce the quantity of patent
validity litigation.163
However, petty patents pose several difficult challenges.
First, they fail to directly stimulate commercialization. 64  For
example, if implemented in the United States, one commentator
predicts there will be "a huge race to acquire these sorts of
patents-... which could diminish the commercialization efforts
of third parties."'65 That is, the ease in which petty patents could
be obtained could result in blocking innovation. 166 Further, it is
unclear whether pursuing second tier protection in lieu of a
traditional patent is financially advantageous. For example, in
Australia, the cost of acquiring its Innovation Patent is not
substantially less than acquiring a standard patent. 167
A petty patent system would most likely negatively affect
small entities. While a petty patent could prevent a competitor
from making, using, or selling an invention, under most
proposals it could only do so for a very limited amount of time,
since a petty patent has a shorter term.' Arguably, being
159 See Bartow, supra note 107, at 13; Pager, supra note 113, at 802; Sichelman,
supra note 128, at 397.
160 Sichelman, supra note 128, at 397.
161 Lee A. Hollaar, A New Look at Patent Reform, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Socly 743, 748 (2005).
162 Sichelman, supra note 128, at 397-98.
163 Bartow, supra note 107, at 25.
164 Sichelman, supra note 128, at 397.
165 Id. at 398.
16 Pager, supra note 113, at 802.
167 Hollaar, supra note 161, at 747.
16 Sichelman, supra note 128, at 397.
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granted several petty patents could enhance an applicant's
image. However, it is unclear whether investors would invest in
a technology protected by a petty patent granted under a less
rigorous novelty standard and only good for a limited term.
Having discussed some of the proposals in the literature, the
following Parts discuss programs currently in use by the USPTO
in addition to new procedures introduced by the passage of the
AIA in 2011.
III. USPTO EXAMINATION PROGRAMS
Policy makers at the USPTO are aware of the desire of some
applicants to speed up the examination process. The challenge is
balancing examination speed and patent quality. Currently,
there are two ways a patent applicant can attempt to speed up
the patent examination process. An applicant may: (1) take
advantage of a prioritized examination program,169 or (2) petition
for the application to be examined under track one accelerated
examination. 170 The goal of both procedures is to speed up patent
examination without sacrificing the quality of the examination.
This Part explains these programs and their relevance to small
entity applicants.
A. Prioritized Examination
Until recently, applicants for a patent could obtain
prioritized examination for their application under the Green
Technology Pilot Program or the Project Exchange Program.
Currently, applicants for a patent may obtain prioritized
examination for their application under one of the following
existing USPTO programs: (1) the Patent Prosecution Highway
Program; (2) Applicant's Age or Health; and (3) the Accelerated
Examination Program.' 7' While the goal of each program is
similar-a speedier examination-each program has different
qualifications and procedures. Each of these programs is
discussed in further detail below.
169 See generally USPTO's Prioritized Patent Examination Program FAQs, U.S.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init events/trackl-FAQS.jsp
(last modified June 2, 2014).
170 Id.
171 See generally Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, Current Options for Prioritized U.S.
Examination, PHARMAPATENTS (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.pharmapatentsblog.com/
current-options-for-prioritized-us-examination.
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The Green Technology Pilot Program was open to
"applications pertaining to environmental quality, energy
conservation, development of renewable energy resources or
greenhouse gas emission reduction."172 In addition to other
requirements, applications filed under the Green Technology
Pilot Program were limited to three independent claims and
twenty claims total, and had to be accompanied by a supporting
statement. 173
The Project Exchange Program, aptly called "Dump One,
Bump One," provided an applicant with prioritized examination
of a pending application if the applicant "expressly abandon[ed]"
another pending application. 174  Under this program, it was
required that "both the application to be prioritized and the
application to be abandoned [be] filed before October 1, 2009."' v'
The Patent Prosecution Highway Program allows U.S.
applicants to receive prioritized examination if they have a
corresponding foreign application that has already received a
favorable patentability determination.1 76  Accordingly, this
requires the applicant to have filed a patent application in a
foreign country and received a determination that at least one
claim in the application is patentable. 77 As of January 6, 2014,
the USPTO launched new pilots under the Global Patent
Prosecution Highway Program and IP5 Patent Prosecution
Highway Program, which includes participating patent offices in
countries such as Japan, Korea, Canada, Australia, Israel,
Russia, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
7 1
172 Green Technology Pilot Program, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init-events/green-tech.jsp (last modified May 7, 2012).
173 Pilot Program for Green Technologies Including Greenhouse Gas Reduction,
74 Fed. Reg. 64,666, 64,667 (Dec. 8, 2009).
174 See Brinckerhoff, supra note 171; Project Exchange-Patent Application
Backlog Reduction Stimulus Plan, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.us
pto.gov/patents/init-events/PatentStimulusPlan.jsp (last modified June 29, 2012).
17r Brinckerhoff, supra note 171.
176 Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH)-Fast Track Examination of
Applications, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/patents/
initevents/pph/index.jsp (last modified Sept. 12, 2014); Brinckerhoff, supra note
171.
177 Brinckerhoff, supra note 171.
"' Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH)-Fast Track Examination of
Applications, supra note 176.
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Under the Applicant's Age or Health program, the applicant
must submit "evidence showing that the applicant is [at least] 65
years of age" or "evidence showing that the state of health of the
applicant is such that he or she might not be available to assist
in the prosecution of the application if it were to run its normal
course, such as a doctor's certificate or other medical
certificate."179 This is a permanent program with no expiration
date. 10
Finally, to participate in the Accelerated Examination
Program, an applicant must take several preliminary steps."'
These steps include: (1) "submitting a description of the pre-
examination search parameters"; (2) "submitting copies of the
closest prior art references"; and (3) "submitting a detailed
discussion of the closest prior art references, pointing out with
particularity how the claims are patentable over the
references.""1 2  The Accelerated Examination Program is also a
permanent program with no expiration date.18 3
An applicant wishing to take advantage of one of these
procedures faces several challenges. First, the above-described
prioritized examination procedures can only be used in very
specific situations and require several additional steps on the
part of the applicant.' 4  For example, the Patent Prosecution
Highway Program requires the existence of previously filed
applications.8 5 Under the Applicant's Age or Health program,
applicants must either meet the age requirement or prove that
179 PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 708.02(III)-(IV) (8th ed. rev. 9, Aug. 2012)
[hereinafter MPEP], available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/old/
e8r9/mpep-0700.pdf.
180 Brinckerhoff, supra note 171.
181 Guidelines for Applicants Under the New Accelerated Examination
Procedure, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/patents/process/file/
accelerated/ae guidelines_20140520.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2014); Brinckerhoff,
supra note 171.
182 Brinckerhoff, supra note 171.
183 Id.
18 See MPEP, supra note 179, § 708.02; Accelerated Examination, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/patents/process/file/accelerated/index.jsp
(last modified May 20, 2014); Green Technology Pilot Program, supra note 172;
Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH)-Fast Track Examination of Applications, supra
note 176; Project Exchange-Patent Application Backlog Reduction Stimulus Plan,
supra note 174.
185 See Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH)-Fast Track Examination of
Applications, supra note 176; Project Exchange-Patent Application Backlog
Reduction Stimulus Plan, supra note 174.
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they are in poor health.8 6 Under the Green Technology Pilot
Program, an applicant had to include a statement asserting that
the invention materially enhances the quality of the environment
by contributing to the restoration or maintenance of the basic
life-sustaining natural elements. 87 Further, an applicant had to
submit a statement explaining how the materiality standard is
met and that the invention "materially contributes to (1) the
discovery or development of renewable energy resources; (2) the
more efficient utilization and conservation of energy resources; or
(3) greenhouse gas emission reduction.' 188
Similarly, the accelerated examination procedure imposes
several additional requirements on an applicant. 189 Specifically,
the accelerated examination procedure requires the applicant to
research potential prior art, and provide the patent office with
the closest prior art and a detailed discussion of the closest prior
art references.1 90 Presumably, this gives the Examiner a starting
point for examination, but these requirements also require
significant additional preparation time on behalf of the applicant.
In cases where professional services are engaged to prepare the
application for accelerated examination, this high level of
complexity translates into a significant increase in professional
fees for preparing and filing a patent application.' 9'
The prioritized examination procedures are probably even
less advantageous to small entities. When considering most of
the available prioritized examination procedures, the threshold
requirement for all applicants is that they meet the eligibility
requirements specific to the program. 92  The eligibility
requirements for most programs are clearly established to benefit
186 See MPEP, supra note 179.
187 Brinckerhoff, supra note 171.
188 Id.
189 MPEP, supra note 179, § 708.02(VIII).
190 Id.
191 Robert D. Gunderman & John M. Hammond, The Limited Monopoly: Faster
than a Speeding Bullet, ROCHESTER ENGINEER, Mar. 2007, at 7, available at
http://www.patenteducation.com/images/200703-LimitedMonopoly-.Accel-examin
ation.pdf; see Dennis Crouch, Accelerated Examination Case Study, PATENTLY-O
BLOG (Feb. 27, 2009), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent2009/02/accelerated-
exa.html.
192 See MPEP, supra note 179, § 708.02; Accelerated Examination, supra note
184; Green Technology Pilot Program, supra note 172; Patent Prosecution Highway
(PPH)-Fast Track Examination of Applications, supra note 176; Project Exchange-
Patent Application Backlog Reduction Stimulus Plan, supra note 174.
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a specific type of applicant. For example, an applicant must be
sixty-five or older or in poor health to take advantage of the
Applicant's Age or Health program. 193 However, none of the
prioritized examination procedures are directly tailored to a
small entity.
In addition, some of the pre-examination requirements for
some of the prioritized examination programs are more complex
than the requirements for normal examination. For example,
under the Accelerated Examination Program, applicants are
required to submit the following: (1) a description of their pre-
examination search parameters; (2) the closest prior art; and
(3) a detailed discussion of those prior art references. 94 Indeed,
satisfactorily meeting the pre-examination requirements is the
most significant hurdle in the Accelerated Examination process.
Almost twenty percent of the applications filed under this
procedure are denied for not meeting the formal pre-examination
requirements. 19  This increased complexity translates into
increased cost to prepare and file an application. 196 Accordingly,
one could argue that these cost increases probably have a
disparate impact on small entities.
Finally, the possible limit imposed on the number of patent
claims is a concern for small entities.197 Several of the prioritized
examination procedures limit the number of independent claims
and total number of claims in an application.' 98 For example, the
Green Technology Pilot Program limited the number of claims to
three independent claims and twenty total claims. 99 In high-
technology industries with a substantial number of small
entities, more than three independent claims and twenty claims
total may be required to describe the invention properly. 200 For
small entities, this raises the question of whether a patent
obtained under certain prioritized examination procedures would
"I MPEP, supra note 179.
194 Id. § 708.02(VIII); Brinckerhoff, supra note 171.
19 Cumulative AE Petition Status, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Apr. 9, 2012),
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/process/file/accelerated/ae-petition-status-2012apr9.
pdf.
196 Gunderman & Hammond, supra note 191; see Crouch, supra note 191.
197 Letter from Susan Walthall, supra note 147.
s See Pilot Program for Green Technologies Including Greenhouse Gas
Reduction, 74 Fed. Reg. 64,666, 64,667 (Dec. 8, 2009); Brinckerhoff, supra note 171.
"I Pilot Program for Green Technologies Including Greenhouse Gas Reduction,
74 Fed. Reg. at 64,667.
2O Letter from Susan Walthall, supra note 147.
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afford the applicant the necessary scope to exclude others from
making, selling, or using their invention. Further, a limit on the
number of claims could have a negative effect on the perceived
value of a granted patent, since the patent could be seen as
limited.
B. The Three-Track Examination Initiative
USPTO policy makers have recently entertained the idea of
allowing applicants to choose from one of three "tracks" to
prosecute their patent application. In June of 2010, the USPTO
requested public comments on the new three-track examination
initiative. 20 ' The proposal states that applicants may choose
from one of three tracks of examination including: (1) prioritized
examination; 2 2 (2) traditional examination; 20 3 or (3) delayed
examination.2 4 Delayed examination allows an applicant to file
a patent application and elect to have it examined at some later
date. 25  The traditional examination track refers to the normal
examination procedures currently being implemented by the
USPTO.206 Finally, the prioritized examination track endeavors
to speed up the patent prosecution process 20 7 and requires a
substantial fee. 208
Some of the most notable features of the prioritized
examination track reflect its purpose or intent. Unlike
accelerated examination, applicants do not have to perform a
patent search or provide any prior art analysis. 20 9  Further,
prioritized examination limits an application to four independent
201 Enhanced Examination Timing Control Initiative; Notice of Public Meeting,
75 Fed. Reg. 31,763, 31,764 (June 4, 2010).
202 As of February 4, 2011, the United States has decided to proceed with track
I. See Changes To Implement the Prioritized Examination Track (Track I) of the
Enhanced Examination Timing Control Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 6,369, 6,369 (Feb.
4, 2011).
203 Enhanced Examination Timing Control Initiative; Notice of Public Meeting,
75 Fed. Reg. at 31,764.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Press Release, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO Proposes To
Establish Three Patent Processing Tracks (June 3, 2010), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2010/10-24.jsp.
208 Id.
209 Enhanced Examination Timing Control Initiative; Notice of Public Meeting,
75 Fed. Reg. at 31,765.
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claims and thirty claims total.210  Concerning timing, the
USPTO's goal is to (1) issue a first office action on the merits of
the application no later than four months after the application
was filed, and (2) issue a final disposition of the case within
twelve months.211
The USPTO believes that this proposal will reduce pendency
of all applications in several ways: (1) "increased resources in
Track I would result in increased output"; (2) "reuse of search
and examination work done by other offices would result in
greater efficiency"; (3) applicants who chose Track III because
their applications were of questionable value might ultimately
not pursue their application examination"; and (4) "applicants
with applications first filed abroad might ultimately not pursue
their application examination." 22  For example, prioritized
examination does not commence for applications based on a prior
foreign-filed application "until the agency receives a copy of the
search report, if any, and first office action from the foreign office
as well as an appropriate reply to the foreign office action as if
the foreign office action was made in the application filed in the
USPTO. 21 3 Accordingly, the goal of prioritized examination is to
reduce pendency times by using USPTO resources more
efficiently and reducing the number of potential applicants.
Despite the projected reduction in pendency, the three-track
proposal may be disadvantageous to small entities in several
ways. In response to the USPTO's request for comments, the
Small Business Administration ("SBA") sent a letter to the
USPTO addressing "the disproportionate impact certain aspects
of this proposal may have on small businesses and small
independent inventors and their ability to fully utilize the
potential benefits of this initiative."21 4 The three-track proposal
essentially requires applicants who want an expedited review of
215 etheir application to pay for the cost of that review. The system
is based on the premise that applicants will pay an undisclosed
fee to have those innovations that are most important examined
210 Id.
211 See Press Release, supra note 207.
212 See id.
213 See id.
214 Letter from Susan Walthall, supra note 147.
215 Amy Schatz, Patent Fast Track Proposed, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2010, 12:01
AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487045157045752829519918942
76.html.
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first.216 While the USPTO did not give details about the amount
of the proposed fee, indications are that the fee will be
"substantial.217
The fee aspect of the proposal overlooks the fact that many
small entities do not have the financial resources to pay
substantial fees. The U.S. patent system recognized this several
years ago when it discounted small entity fees by fifty percent.218
The SBA letter stated:
[S]mall entities have expressed concern that they will be unable
to utilize the benefits of the rapid examination option because of
the substantial fee required to request this track option. They
have expressed concern that they will be placed at a
disadvantage compared to those applicants who have greater
financial backing and can request rapid review.219
"Patent-office officials say the proposed fast-track plan won't
leave small inventors behind because they already receive a 50%
discount on fees."220  However, the USPTO acknowledged that
any discount on fees for small entities would depend upon the
USPTO obtaining enhanced fee-setting authority from
Congress. 221 Because the fee to enter Track I is feared by many
to be prohibitive to small entities, it is uncertain whether such a
proposal will do anything to encourage small entities to file
patent applications.
In addition, Track II and Track III are not particularly
promising for small entities. For example, the SBA expressed
concern that pendency in the traditional second track would
increase because resources would be diverted to Track 1.222 Thus,
Track II, the default track, would become slower than the current
process is now.
In addition, while the belief is that Track III will give
applicants more time to determine whether their invention is
commercially viable, research shows that many small entities
need patents granted sooner, not later, to obtain funding.2 1
216 Id.
217 Letter from Susan Walthall, supra note 147.
218 Schatz, supra note 215.
219 Letter from Susan Walthall, supra note 147.
220 Schatz, supra note 215.
221 Enhanced Examination Timing Control Initiative; Notice of Public Meeting,
75 Fed. Reg. 31,763, 31,765 (June 4, 2010).
222 Letter from Susan Walthall, supra note 147.
223 Id.
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Many developing countries allow applicants to defer examination
of their application for as long as seven years.224 Delaying
examination benefits the patent office by relieving it of the
burden and expense of conducting examinations on deferred
applications.225 One of the arguments that deferred examination
favors applicants is that deferring examination allows inventors
to test their invention in the marketplace before incurring the
expense of patent prosecution.226 However, a deferred application
awaiting examination would not assist small entities in
preventing others from copying their invention.227 Further, since
research suggests that many investors consider a small entity's
patents before investing in that business, it is unclear whether
deferring examination would provide any advantage whatsoever
to small entities attempting to secure investment.228  Finally,
having an application in the queue of deferred examination is
likely to do nothing for small entities' reputation or standing.229
The SBA further stated that several small entities had also
expressed concern about limiting the number of independent
claims and the number of total claims allowed.23 ° In support of
this concern, the SBA argued that in industries with a large
number of micro-entities, a lot of claims are required to describe
the parameters of the potential patent properly. 231 Limiting the
number of claims could have a negative effect on the perceived
value of a granted patent, since the patent could be seen as
limited.
As can be seen from the discussion above, scholars and policy
makers have introduced numerous proposals and programs
designed to reduce the time and cost required to obtain a patent
while attempting to enhance the quality of the resulting
patent.232  Unfortunately, many of these proposals have a
disparate impact on small entities. Accordingly, the remainder of
this Article suggests more direct proposals targeted specifically
at small entities.
224 Pager, supra note 113, at 786.
221 See id.
226 See id.
227 Id.
228 Graham et al., supra note 22, at 1280.
229 Id. at 1298.
230 Letter from Susan Walthall, supra note 147.
21 See id.
232 See supra Part III.A-B.
2014]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
IV. A SMALL ENTITY PRIORITIZED EXAMINATION PILOT PROGRAM
A. Introduction
This Article has reviewed some recent and popular proposals
to reform the patent system.233 These proposals attempt to
change the patent system to make it quicker, more cost effective,
and produce higher quality patents. However, most of these
proposals assume a one-size-fits-all approach or propose various
options to applicants without any guidance as to which of these
options will suit them best.236 Unfortunately, none of these
proposals directly addresses the problems and needs of small
entities in today's economy.
Accordingly, the following discussion sets forth a tailored
patent reform proposal that attempts to benefit small entities.
The USPTO should implement a pilot program solely targeting
small entities. The goal of the pilot program would be to assist
eligible patentees in acquiring a faster, high-quality examination
of their applications. Both anecdotal and empirical evidence
suggest that innovative small entities are important to the U.S.
economy. 5  Further, some small entities use their granted
patents to obtain additional funding.236 Thus, acquiring, using,
and enforcing patent rights could play a significant role in the
success of small entities.237  The proposed program will
hereinafter be referred to as Small Entity Prioritized
Examination ("SEPE").
The proposed SEPE program provides for an optional
prosecution track available only to small entities.238 To permit a
more focused and rigorous examination, this Article suggests
that the number of small entity patent applications eligible for
SEPE be limited to a finite number.239 In addition, to ensure that
applicants new to the patent process have a chance to
participate, the number of times an applicant can be declared
233 See supra Part III.B.
234 Enhanced Examination Timing Control Initiative; Notice of Public Meeting,
75 Fed. Reg. 31,763, 31,765 (June 4, 2010).
235 McKee, supra note 9.
2-36 Graham et al., supra note 22, at 1259.
237 RAI ET AL., supra note 18, at 1.
238 Changes To Implement the Prioritized Examination Track (Track I) of the
Enhanced Examination Timing Control Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 6,369, 6,370 (Feb.
4, 2011) (stating that only a showing that the applicant is a small entity is required).
239 See generally Katopis, supra note 36.
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eligible for SEPE should also be limited.24 ° No new or additional
USPTO fees should be required. Unlike the now defunct
program for biotechnology small entities and other past
prioritized examination policies, this Article suggests that
applications pertaining to any technology area be eligible.
Finally, in conjunction with the program, this Article suggests
that patent data be made available to the public through a patent
valuation model that analyzes the value of patents based on:
(1) the importance of the patent to the applicant, and (2) the
patent's market value. Using this data, USPTO stakeholders
could adjust the program as needed to facilitate the patenting of
high value patents. The specific aspects of the SEPE program
are detailed below.
B. Small Entity Prioritized Examination
1. Eligibility
The proposed program should limit eligibility to small
entities, unlike some of the reform proposals discussed above and
the current USPTO prioritized examination procedures. 241' There
is precedent for treating small entities differently than larger
firms. First, under 35 U.S.C. § 41(h)(1), the USPTO charges
small entities half the amount it charges larger firms for
administrative fees.242 In addition, the USPTO has implemented
a prioritized examination program for small entities filing
patents strictly in the biotechnology area.243 Here, limiting
eligibility to small entities: (1) reduces the amount of applications
that can take advantage of the program, and (2) may encourage
more small entities to file patent applications. Further, because
eligibility is limited to small entities, one administrative benefit
of the proposal is that the USPTO could implement changes to
the small entity program that would affect a small sample of
applicants across all technology areas. Obtaining small entity
patent data from across all the technology areas may provide
useful insights into patenting activity across many different
industries.
240 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 123, 125 Stat. 284,
318 (2011).
241 See supra Part III.A-B.
242 35 U.S.C. § 41(h)(1) (2012).
242 See MPEP, supra note 179, § 708.02(XII).
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One critique of the proposed SEPE program argues that
small entities should not be singled out and given preferential
treatment.2" Indeed, patent traditionalists may view the
segregation of patent applications in this way with hostility.2
41
In response, one need only look to the recent increase in concern
and interest in small entities to understand that there is
evidence that the problems of the patent system may have a
disparate impact on small entities.246 If one accepts the premise
that small entities are important to U.S. innovation, and more
importantly the economy as a whole, then one may reasonably
conclude that more must be done to assist small entities in
patenting their inventions. Further, one could argue that the
proposed program is simply rationing examination resources to
effectively address a perceived deficiency and encourage
innovation.
In order to fully support future innovation, the proposed
program should be open to all technologies that meet the current
requirements for patentability. Governments, including the
United States, have in the past and still currently conduct
programs that encourage patenting in specific technology
sectors. 247 For example, applicants that had inventions directed
to "green" technologies could take advantage of the USPTO's
Green Technology Pilot Program. However, one commentator
has argued that the government is not the best entity to select
what technology area will necessarily result in the growth of the
economy.248  Under the proposed SEPE program, the risk of
incorrectly focusing on a single technology area is minimized
because any technology is eligible.
244 Sara Tran, Prioritizing Innovation, 30 WIS. INT'L L.J. 499, 539 (2012).
245 See Merges, supra note 156, at 597-98.
246 See Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent Protection, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 151,
151 (1999); Katopis, supra note 36, at 399-400.
247 See, e.g., Pilot Program for Green Technologies Including Greenhouse Gas
Reduction, 74 Fed. Reg. 64,666, 64,666 (Dec. 8, 2009).
248 THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 2,
at 202.
All too often, the importance of growth for a nation's economy has enticed
governments into providing support for particular innovative projects that
they favor or even to entire arenas of innovative activity that they consider
the wave of the future. The trouble is that the governments have not
proven too successful in the task of picking winners, that is, in selecting
projects where such government funding will have the highest payoff.
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Opening up the SEPE program to all technology areas will
likely attract a number of applicants. Although the percentage of
small entity patents has declined, the number of total
applications filed each year continues to rise. In the year 2012,
542,815 applications were filed.249 Just ten years before that in
2002, the number of applications filed was 334,445.250
Accordingly, some limits must be placed on the number of
applicants to keep quality high and prevent a significant backlog.
2. Selectivity
In response to backlog concerns, this Article suggests that
the SEPE program limit the number of applications examined to
a predetermined number per some period of time-month,
quarter, year, and so forth. As one commentator has noted, a
limitation of this kind permits a more focused examination of
some patent applications.251 Presumably, the proposed limitation
will also lower the cost of implementing the SEPE program by
limiting the number of additional examiners the USPTO may
have to hire for implementation. Limiting the workload of the
examiners encourages higher quality examination by not
overburdening examiners. Policy makers at the USPTO are best
situated to determine the optimum number of applications that
should be accepted into the SEPE program per a given time
period.
Another decision policy makers would have to make is how
to decide which applications are accepted into the program.
While selecting them at random might be interesting, the fairest
way to select applications seems to be accepting applications on a
first-come, first-serve basis. This is consistent with other special
examination programs. Another challenge for policy makers
would be how to deal with the different rate of examinations that
exists among technology centers.2 2 One solution to this problem
is that the USPTO could vary the number of applications
accepted by a technology center. This is somewhat similar to the
procedure that was used to limit the amount of applications
249 U.S. Patent Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963-2013, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/aido/oeip/taf/us-stat.htm (last
modified July 24, 2014).
250 Id.
251 Katopis, supra note 36, at 363-64.
252 See id. at 395-96.
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accepted into the green technology pilot.253 The overall goal is to
limit the number of SEPE applications to a finite amount.
Presumably, the USPTO would be capable of providing those
applications with a more focused quality examination.254
To further limit the application pool, the SEPE program
should also limit the number of times an applicant can
participate in the program. For example, an inventor A may
have X number of applications accepted for processing under
SEPE in a given time frame-for example, three years.2 55 After
the Xth application is accepted under the proposed program, any
later filed application naming inventor A would be ineligible to
participate in the program.
Presumably, policy makers at the USPTO would be able to
determine the optimal value for X. Some factors they might
consider when determining the number of applications allowed
for a specific inventor are examiner capacity, average pendency
of applications in the SEPE program, and the likelihood that the
program will only be used by a select few applicants. The
purpose of this procedure is to allow the program to continue to
attract new applicants and ensure that the program caters to as
many applicants as possible.
An additional criticism alleges that applicants could unfairly
exploit the proposed SEPE program. Two factors make this
possibility less likely. First, the number of invitations to
participate would be limited based on inventors named on the
application. Falsifying the inventorship of a patent application
could have serious validity consequences.256 Second, the limited
number of applicants invited to participate in the proposed
program would not justify the effort or cost of engaging in
dishonest practices. Accordingly, several safeguards exist that
would prevent applicants from exploiting the SEPE program.
253 See, e.g., Pilot Program for Green Technologies Including Greenhouse Gas
Reduction, 74 Fed. Reg. 64,666, 64,666 (Dec. 8, 2009).
254 Katopis, supra note 36, at 368.
255 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 123, 125 Stat. 284,
318 (2011).
256 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
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3. Flexibility
Given the expected limitations on the number of applicants
that could be selected, the proposed SEPE program should be one
of many options available to small entity applicants.
Accordingly, normal examination and prioritized examination
under one of the other existing programs would also be available
to the small entity applicant. 25 '7 This mirrors the policy followed
by other special USPTO examination programs. In addition, it
provides the applicant with flexibility in choosing how they
would like to prosecute their patent application.
For increased flexibility, this Article also suggests that the
SEPE program provide two decision points for small entity
applicants to avail themselves of prioritized examination. First,
the SEPE program should provide the applicant with an option to
opt in at the time of the filing of the application. Similar to other
special examination programs, this could be accomplished by the
applicant by filing a petition. But, unlike current prioritized
examination programs, the only showing that would be needed to
opt in to the SEPE program is that the applicant qualifies as a
small entity.25 This lower requirement opens the program up to
applicants across a spectrum of technologies and does not require
the time investment that the New Accelerated Examination
procedure does.
Second, once the applicant is notified by the USPTO that the
application has been accepted into the SEPE program, the
USPTO should offer the applicant a chance to opt out before the
application is assigned to an Examiner. Based on reported time
frames, this window could be anywhere from five to eighteen
months.25 9 The purpose of this second decision point is to give
applicants time to: (1) correct any informalities; (2) obtain any
information that might assist them in determining whether
prosecuting the application is a priority;26 ° and (3) ensure that
they are committed to going through with a speedy examination
procedure.
257 Id.
258 See supra Part I.B.
29 Data Visualization Center, supra note 39 (showing that the average wait
time for a first office action for track I is about five months and the average wait
time for a first office action following the regular procedures is about eighteen
months).
260 See supra Part III.C.
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However, opting out at this point should come at a price to
the applicant. As detailed earlier, the proposed SEPE program
limits the number of times a named inventor/applicant may
petition to enter the SEPE program.26 ' Similarly, the USPTO
should limit the number of times applicants can withdraw their
application at the second decision point. Because the proposed
SEPE program is optional at more than one stage, it also
provides applicants with greater flexibility in choosing how they
wish to prosecute their application.
4. Cost and Quality
In addition to timing, the SEPE program also addresses the
cost of obtaining a patent. Ideally, the affordability of the SEPE
program will be competitive with other existing special
examination programs. From the applicant perspective, since
the SEPE program is optional and only requires a showing that
the applicant is a small entity, it should not impose any
additional fees on small entities. Accordingly, the amount of
USPTO fees imposed on an application examined under the
proposed program is the same as the amount of fees for a small
entity application examined today. 62  Attorney's fees should
remain competitive because the examination process and
standards are the same as those currently in practice. In fact,
shortening the period of time within which a complete
examination of an application takes place may save the applicant
money.263
However, from the USPTO's perspective, the program will
most likely increase costs. A recent report estimates that the
USPTO has an operating reserve of approximately $442.3
million.264  Thus, the financial position of the USPTO seems
healthy enough to absorb additional costs. Further, the patent
valuation model, described below, will assist in collecting data
261 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 123, 125 Stat. 284,
318 (2011).
262 35 U.S.C. § 41(h)(1) (2012).
263 Because speed and quality are improved, one could reasonably conclude that
the cost of prosecution will be reduced. This hypothesis could be tested using
empirical evidence gathered during the pilot of the program.
264 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PERFORMANCE
AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 75 (2013), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY2013PAR.pdf (discussing the
financial highlights for the USPTO in the 2013 fiscal year).
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that will allow policy makers to quantify any benefits gained by
the program. If those benefits are greater than the cost of
implementing the SEPE program, then it may be wise to make it
permanent, or at a minimum expand the pool of applicants.
One benefit patent stakeholders might experience from a
slight increase in administrative costs is that the speed of the
examination process is maintained or increased. The goal of the
proposed SEPE program is to complete the examination of an
application in significantly less time than is achieved by regular
examination. In 2014, the average time it took to obtain final
disposition on an application was 27.2 months.265 In some
technology areas, the pendency time can be longer or shorter.
For example, the average amount of time a software patent is
pending can be 32.3 months or more. 6  The newest Track I
prioritized examination program has a pendency time of about
five months.267  Reportedly, the average pendency of an
application in the Green Technology Pilot Program was about
twenty months.268 Given the examination window of these
existing programs, the SEPE program should endeavor to have a
similar pendency time period of anywhere from five to twenty
months.
Finally, the proposed SEPE program should not negatively
affect patent quality. As mentioned above, the SEPE program
limits the number of applications that can be examined over a
predetermined period of time.2 69  This should keep examiners'
workloads manageable. Presumably, examiners will be able to
perform a more focused examination, resulting in higher quality
patents.2 70 In addition, the SEPE program will benefit from new
procedures instituted under the AIA to increase patent quality.
265 Data Visualization Center, supra note 39 (explaining that final disposition
means either that a patent was granted or the application was abandoned).
266 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 264, at 190.
267 Data Visualization Center, supra note 39 (explaining that the average time
an application is pending from the grant of the petition to allowance of the
application is 5.1 months).
266 See Pendency, WAY BETTER PATENTS, http://www.waybetterpatents.com/
greentechnology/pendency.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2014) (reporting that the mean
pendency time for an application in the Green Technology Pilot Program was 19.7
months).
269 Limiting the number of applicants invited to participate in the proposed
program provides the USPTO with an opportunity to study examiner productivity in
a more controlled environment.
21 See Katopis, supra note 36, at 390.
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For example, the third-party submission program will allow
interested third parties to submit prior art to an examiner that
they think is relevant to a pending application."' In addition,
newly granted patents can be challenged under the new post-
grant procedures. In sum, maintaining a reasonable
examination workload and the patent quality procedures under
the AIA will ensure that applications granted under the SEPE
program are of the same quality as those examined normally.
5. Summary
The proposed program attempts to directly address the
issues small entities encounter with the patent examination
process in an effort to avoid many of the criticisms leveled
against other patent reform proposals. 2  However, even given
this direct approach, several critiques of the proposed program
can be anticipated. Further, even though the proposed SEPE
program is uniquely tailored to small entities, it is difficult to
predict whether the program will have the desired effect. That
is, will more small entities apply for and subsequently be granted
a patent? Will the increase in patents granted to small entities
stimulate the innovation and, in turn, the economy? These
questions can only be answered satisfactorily by monitoring the
program during the pilot phase and closely analyzing the data
that is collected. It is clear that much of the infrastructure and
procedures to implement the proposed SEPE program are
already in place at the USPTO.27 ' If implemented, at best the
goals set forth above are realized. In the alternative, the USPTO
has the opportunity to collect and analyze data related only to
small entities. This data could be used to help the USPTO better
serve small entity applicants. In sum, implementing a pilot
phase of the proposed SEPE program will be beneficial to small
entities and the USPTO in various ways.
The proposed SEPE program provides several additional
advantages. It directly addresses the problems that exist with
the speed and quality of patent prosecution. The goal of the
proposed SEPE program is to complete the examination of an
271 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.290 (2014).
272 See Janis, supra note 246, at 180-82.
273 See generally Prioritized Examination for Non-Provisional Utility
Applications, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/aia-
implementation/track-l-quickstart-guide.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).
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application in significantly less time than regular examination.
The SEPE proposal is purposefully flexible to allow for
modification and customization. While several other conditions
could be included in the proposed program, this Article sets forth
specific proposals that represent the guiding principles. The
common theme of these proposals is that they do not add extra
burdens on the applicant that could potentially increase the cost
of prosecuting the application 4.27  For example, the proposed
program could be made eligible to only U.S. inventors . 7  Another
proposal, similar to that implemented in the current green
technology pilot, is that the number of independent claims be
limited and that the total number of claims eligible for
examination also be limited. 276  Because the proposed SEPE
program is flexible, it will allow the USPTO to adapt quickly to
serve the best interests of small entity applicants and ensure
that patents of high quality are issued. More importantly, one
hopes that the proposed program will instill in small entities new
confidence in the patent system. 7
V. EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRIORITIZED
EXAMINATION
Patent quality is an important initiative for the USPTO.278
Accordingly, simply proposing a new program without a way to
determine if quality patents are being produced is not enough.
Metrics should be used to determine the effectiveness of the
program over time with respect to the quality of the patent that
is issued. However, how the USPTO measures quality and how
274 Cf. Changes to Practice for Petitions in Patent Applications To Make Special
and for Accelerated Examination, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,323, 36,325 (June 26, 2006)
(stating that accelerated examination in the USPTO contains several requirements,
such as an information disclosure statement).
27 See U.S. Patent Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963-2013, supra note 249
(stating that 50.5% of the applications filed in 2012 were of foreign origin).
Accordingly, limiting the SEPE applicant pool to U.S. applications may significantly
decrease the pool of eligible applications. However, there is a possibility such a
policy would not be received well by foreign governments.
276 Pilot Program for Green Technologies Including Greenhouse Gas Reduction,
74 Fed. Reg. 64,666, 64,666 (Dec. 8, 2009).
277 See Merges, supra note 156, at 595. In addition, the possibility of being
invited to participate in the pilot program will encourage small entities to apply for
patents. Again, this hypothesis could be easily tested and proven using empirical
data.
271 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 264, at 25.
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the market measures quality do not necessarily align.
Traditional data collected by the USPTO generally keep track of
how many patents are issued each year and to whom .2 9 But,
these metrics do not tell us anything about the value of the
patent itself. Is the patent being commercialized? Is the
technology being licensed? Are competitors designing around the
patent? In order to provide some indication as to whether
prioritized examination procedures are effective at granting
valuable patents, there is a need for a model that captures
publicly available information and presents it in a way that tells
USPTO stakeholders something about the patent's potential
value.
Accordingly, why not attempt to evaluate whether patents
granted from specialized programs such as the proposed SEPE
have acquired a measure of quality and value? This Part
outlines a modified patent valuation model based on the
Littmann-Hilmer and Kuckartz Innovation and Patent-Centre
("IPC") valuation tool.280 The objective of the valuation model is
to help applicants and the patent office identify potentially
valuable patents at very early stages in the patent's term. In
addition to the proposed SEPE program, the valuation model
could be used to evaluate any of the examination programs
already in existence.
The goal of the proposed patent valuation model is to assist
the USPTO and applicants in evaluating the value of granted
patents. This information could help the USPTO in allocating
examination resources and providing inventor assistance in
technology areas that trend toward higher value. Predicting the
potential future value of a patent is difficult because, in most
cases, the products that will be developed based on the patent, if
any, are not defined."' However, in some instances, patents
owned by a company can be correlated with the company's
profits.8 2 Thus, relying on certain data, it may be possible to
gleam some insight as to how valuable a granted patent is to a
patentee.
279 See id. at 189-90.
280 Gudrun Littmann-Hilmer & Michael Kuckartz, SME Tailor-Designed Patent
Portfolio Analysis, WORLD PAT. INFO., 2009, at 274.
281 See id. at 273.
282 See id.
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Littmann-Hilmer and Kuckartz have developed a tool for
evaluating the patent portfolios of SMEs.28 ' This method was
developed in Germany in response to a need for SMEs to be able
to evaluate their patent portfolios.284 The evaluation method is
based on a Boston Consulting Group portfolio matrix.285  The
matrix assists analysts in evaluating products based on their
relative market share and the growth in that market.8 6
Littman-Hilmer and Kuckartz built off this foundation to tailor a
tool specific to evaluating patents obtained by SMEs.
The Littman-Hilmer and Kuckartz tool accounts for several
challenges in evaluating a patent's value. For patents, market
share is difficult to calculate, since the technology may not have
been commercialized. 28 7  In addition, previous evaluation
methods did not consider that SMEs may only have one patent or
need to evaluate one patent and not an entire portfolio.288 Unlike
other patent portfolio evaluation techniques, the Littman-Hilmer
and Kuckartz tool is based on: (1) assessing the market value of a
patent,2 9 and (2) the importance of the patent to the patentee or
assignee.2 90 Further, the model evaluates single patents as they
are and claims to be efficient and cost effective. 291 This Article
deviates from Littman-Hilmer and Kuckartz in how they
determine the importance of the patent to the patentee or
assignee. However, this Article adopts the methodology
described by Littman-Hilmer and Kuckartz for determining the
market value of a patent.
A. Market Value
A patent's market value is a measure of how much it is
worth as an asset. Within the context of the Littman-Hilmer and
Kuckartz tool, the market value of a patent is a function of a
number of measurable factors. Patent-specific indicators of the
market value of a patent include: (1) forward citations;
(2) market coverage; (3) technological scope of protection; (4) the
283 See id.
284 See id.
288 See id. at 274.
286 See id.
287 See id.
288 See id.
289 See id. at 275.
290 See id. at 276.
211 See id. at 277.
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legal scale of protection; and (5) the international scope of
backward citations.292 Each factor is explained in more detail
below.
Forward citations-how many times the patent is cited by
others-is an indication of patent value.2 93 A higher value patent
is generally cited more than a lower value patent.294 Accordingly,
the IPC valuation model uses citations to calculate a patent's
market value.295
Market coverage refers to the number of corresponding
foreign patents that are associated with the patent.296 It has
been empirically proven that broader market coverage-a larger
number of corresponding foreign patents-correlates with higher
patent value.297
Each patent is assigned to a range of predefined technology
classes that relate to a technology or application embodied by the
invention. 29 The market coverage calculation assumes that the
greater the market coverage of a patent, the greater its value.299
The more classes a patent has been assigned to, then the more
value it is perceived to have. 00
Like technological classes, the IPC valuation model also
considers claims as an indicator of market value. 1 Specifically,
the IPC algorithm takes into account the number of independent
and dependent claims included in a patent.30 2 The legal scope of
independent claims is considered greater than the legal scope of
dependent claims. 3
In contrast to forward citations, the concept of backward
citations refers to the number of patents that are cited either by
the applicant or by the Examiner during prosecution of the
patent application. 4 Depending upon the time at which the
292 See id. at 275.
293 See id.; see also Xiaojun Hu et al., On the Definition of Forward and
Backward Citation Generations, J. INFORMETRICS, 2011, at 27-28.
294 Littmann-Hilmer & Kuckartz, supra note 280, at 275.
295 See id.
296 See id.
297 See id.
298 See id.
299 See id.
390 See id.
301 See id.
3029 See id.
303 See id.
304 See id.
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data is gathered, the number of backward citations can mean
different things. 3°5 For example, before the patent is granted, a
long citation record may have a negative impact on the patent's
value. 6 After the patent is granted, a lengthy number of
citations can be an indicator of the patent's relative strength and
increased value.0 7
Given the variables discussed above, the IPC valuation tool
algorithm for calculating the market value (MV) is:
MV = P L , F , (ax MC+ b x S xLS+ dxFWD + ex BWD)
where (P) is the patent, (MC) is the market coverage, (TS) is the
technological scope, (LS) is the legal scale, (FWD) is the number
of forward citations, and (BWD) is the number of backward
citations.30 8 The variables (a), (b), (c), (d), and e represent the
industry-specific weight.30 9 The resulting value is normalized so
that a number of 1.0 is the mean and a number of 2.0 is the
maximum.3 1 0 This allows for patents to simply be grouped as
above-average or below-average.'
The market value of a patent is the function of several
factors. These factors are traditional indicators of patent
strength and value. However, given a patent's market value, the
valuation process is still incomplete. In order to figure out a true
valuation of a patent, in addition to market value, this Article
suggests that the importance of the patent to the applicant must
also be taken into consideration.
B. Applicant Importance
The IPC patent valuation tool also measures the "company
value" of a patent.1 2 Company value represents the importance
of the patent to the company.13 It is measured using the
turnover or profit margin of a product covered by the patent and
305 See id.; see also Hu et al., supra note 293.
306 See Littmann-Hilmer & Kuckartz, supra note 280, at 275.
307 See id.
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 Id.
312 See id. at 274.
313 Id.
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the research and development costs associated with a product
embodying an invention.14  Thus, an accurate value of the
patent's company value would rely heavily on accurate data
about how much a company spent on developing products related
to the invention and the revenue it received from
commercializing those products. While this data may be readily
obtainable within a firm, those outside the firm, including the
USPTO, cannot easily gather this data without substantial
assistance from the patentees.
Accordingly, this Article suggests that policy makers should
identify factors that reflect the importance of the patent to a
patentee ("applicant importance") that can be easily obtained and
measured. The proposed valuation model takes into account
factors that can be measured during the prosecution of a patent
to determine how important the application is to the applicant.
The applicant importance metric presumes that the more active
and timely an applicant is in the patenting process, the more
important the patent is to the applicant. Obtaining empirical
proof of this hypothesis is beyond the scope of this Article.
However, the hypothesis is grounded in years of prosecution
experience and anecdotal evidence. Accordingly, this Article
identifies several measurable factors that are related to applicant
activity and could be indicative of applicant importance.
The applicant importance factor is a function of several
variables. Each variable is, for the most part, influenced directly
by the applicant or patentee. Specifically, the applicant
importance value incorporates: (1) the number of other
applications filed by applicant (AF); (2) whether expedited
examination has been requested (EE); (3) the number of
Requests for Continuing Examination filed (RCE); (4) the
timeliness of applicant responses (T); and (5) the number of
examiner interviews conducted (El). Thus, the applicant
importance value assumes that these factors have an elevating
effect on the importance of a patent to a company. Further,
unlike the factors listed in the IPC tool, the proposed factors can
be measured by the patent office itself without any knowledge of
a company's business plans.
314 See id.
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The number of patent applications filed by an applicant
could be a useful clue in determining how important a patent is
to the applicant. Presumably, the fewer applications an
applicant has filed, the more important the applicant views any
pending applications. Conversely, the more applications the
applicant has on file, the less important one particular
application is likely to be. Further research may be needed to
confirm these presumptions, if they can be confirmed at all.
Accordingly, it is advisable to assign the applications filed (AF)
value with less weight than some of the other factors.
The expedited examination factor (EE) indicates whether or
not a patentee has requested his or her application be examined
quicker than normal. This factor presumes that applicants will
expedite the examination of patents that are important to them
and their business objectives. Conversely, it assumes that patent
applications examined through normal USPTO procedures are
less important to an applicant. Policy makers should
acknowledge that this factor could also be a function of the
applicant's finances and interest.
During prosecution, an applicant can file an RCE after they
have received a final office action. 1 A filing of an RCE indicates
that the applicant wishes to continue prosecuting the application
despite the fact that the applicant has received a final office
action.31 An RCE can be an indication that an applicant for a
patent does not wish to give up on prosecuting the patent.
An applicant can also request an extension of time during
prosecution of a patent to respond to correspondence the
applicant has received from the USPTO, including office
actions." 7 Whether an applicant has taken an extension of time
in responding to an office action and the number of extensions
taken by the applicant throughout prosecution of a patent may be
an indication of applicant importance. Timely filed replies could
suggest that acquiring the patent is a pressing concern for the
"' See 37 C.F.R. § 1.114(a) (2014) (explaining that an applicant can request
continued examination of a patent application that has been closed by filing a
submission and a fee).
316 See id. § 1.114(b) (explaining that prosecution of an application is closed if
the USPTO issues a final office action).
317 See id. § 1.136 (explaining that an applicant may extend the time period to
reply to communications-including office actions-requiring a response within a
nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period).
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applicant. In the alternative, a number of administrative
reasons can cause applicants to take extensions of time. Thus,
the timeliness value (T) should be weighted accordingly.
Finally, the number of examiner interviews that were
conducted during prosecution of an application could be an
indicator of applicant importance. Examiner interviews allow
applicants or their attorney to meet with the Examiner of the
application.1 Examiner interviews are viewed as helpful to both
the applicant and Examiner in understanding the invention and
how its claims might be structured to overcome any claim
rejections. Examiner interviews are also believed to speed up
prosecution of the application. For example, Track I Prioritized
Examination requires the applicant to have an examiner
interview. 19  However, interviews are time intensive and
typically require additional preparation. Accordingly, if an
application is of low priority for applicants, they may wish not to
conduct an examiner interview. Conversely, if an applicant
conducts an examiner interview, it could be a strong indicator of
the application's importance to the applicant.
Given the above considerations, the suggested algorithm for
calculating applicant importance is:
The variables (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) represent a
predetermined specific weighting.2 ° For example, the weights
could be used to emphasize that some factors may be stronger
than others in determining how important a patent is to a
patentee. The resulting value is normalized so that a number of
1.0 is the mean and a number of 2.0 is the maximum. 321 This
allows for patents to simply be grouped as above-average or
below-average.2 2
318 See id. § 1.133 (setting forth the rules for how and when an applicant may
conduct an interview with the examiner to discuss patentability of a pending
application).
319 See MPEP, supra note 179, § 708.02 (stating that the applicant must agree to
an examiner interview when requested by the examiner).
320 See Littman-Hilmer & Kuckartz, supra note 280, at 275 (explaining that the
variables a, b, c, d, and e are each an industry-specific weighting).
321 See id.
322 Id.
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By plotting company value in conjunction with the market
value calculation, the Littmann-Hilmer and Kuckartz IPC patent
analysis tool suggests various strategies for exploiting the subject
patent.323 Similarly, the following Section proposes plotting the
applicant importance in conjunction with the market value
calculation to realize a patent valuation based on those two
factors.
C. The Proposed Patent Analysis Model
The proposed patent analysis model depicts the value of a
patent using the market value and applicant importance values
described above. This Section includes an explanation of how to
interpret the results.
As seen below, the results of the equations for each patent
can be divided into four quadrants. 24 Patents that have a high
market value but low applicant interest value are placed in
quadrant one.325 Quadrant two patents have both a high market
value and applicant interest.326 Patents in quadrant three have a
low market value and low applicant interest value. 27 Patents in
quadrant four have a low market value but high applicant
interest value.328
323 Id.
324 Id.
325 Id.
326 Id. at 276.
327 Id.
328 Id.
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Proposed Patent Valuation Model
Applcn lmporlaqce Value
For each quadrant, similar to Littmann-Hilmer and
Kuckartz's IPC tool, the Proposed Patent Valuation Model
recommends certain strategies. For example, patents falling into
quadrant one-high market value, low applicant interest value-
could be exploited in numerous ways. These ways include
creating new business units to exploit the technology, spinning
off another company, or licensing out the technology. 29 In
contrast, patents that find themselves in quadrant two-high
market value and high applicant interest value-are normally
exploited by the company itself"I Alternatively, the model
recommends patents in quadrant three-low market value, low
applicant interest value-should simply be abandoned.33 1
Finally, the model suggests that the value of the patents in
quadrant four may be overestimated.3 32  Here, instead of
exploiting the technology embodied by quadrant four, patent
alternatives, such as patent pools, cross licensing, and joint
venture opportunities, should be pursued.
121 Id. at 275-76.
330 Id. at 276.
331 Id.
832 Id.
13 See id. at 277.
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The method described by Littmann-Hilmer and Kuckartz
has several advantages. It provided guidance to the companies
that participated based on the quadrant in which the patent
fell. 34 One insight gained was how to differentiate between non-
commercialized-blocking-patents of high and low value.
Further, the authors found that non-technical decision makers in
the company could easily understand the valuation of each
patent and what that meant strategically for the company.336
In sum, the data acquired and evaluated by the Proposed
Patent Valuation Model is helpful in evaluating the value of
certain granted patents. More empirical study could confirm
whether the strategies suggested in the IPC tool apply equally as
well to patents evaluated under the Proposed Patent Valuation
Model introduced here. Until that data is collected and analyzed,
this Article stops short of asserting that the generic patent-
portfolio strategies outlined by Littmann-Hilmer and Kuckartz
would apply to a valuation based on market value and applicant
importance. However, this is an area for future research and
investigation.
If the Proposed Patent Valuation Model proved viable, then,
in addition to the implementation of the proposed SEPE, this
Article proposes that the valuation model also be implemented
and made publicly available to patent stakeholders. A valuation
system could accomplish two primary goals. First, it could allow
the USPTO to learn which patents are of the most value in the
marketplace. Second, based on the data available for similar
patents, the valuation model could help patentees predict
whether using certain expedited examination procedures is
worth the money and help allocate their limited patenting budget
in an efficient manner. Overall, the data acquired from use of
the model could assist all USPTO stakeholders at various stages
of the patenting process.
CONCLUSION
With respect to patent policy, small entities need direct
proposals that specifically address their patenting challenges
based upon what policy makers already know about: (1) small
... See id.
335 See id.
336 See id.
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entity patenting behavior, and (2) the long-term impact
innovations developed by small firms can have on the U.S.
economy. Accordingly, this Article proposes that the USPTO
implement a prioritized examination program for small entities.
In addition, this Article suggests that policy makers shift from
using metrics that simply capture the number of patents that are
granted and instead employ a patent valuation model to monitor
all USPTO examination programs.
Used in conjunction with the existing USPTO quality
metrics, a patent valuation model that attempts to monitor the
economic impact of granted patents may provide interesting
insights. First, the data may assist in our understanding of the
link between patenting activity and innovation that has an
impact on the U.S. economy. Second, the data could be useful to
the USPTO in creating new initiatives or modifying existing
prioritized examination programs for maximum effectiveness.
This is a fruitful area for future empirical research, and further
study is needed to determine if such a patent valuation model
can assist in this process. Patents filed under the now defunct
special status provision for biotechnology small entity applicants
may make an effective test sample. 37 Data from such a study
could be useful in determining whether such a specialized
program for small entities is: (1) effective at generating quality
patents, and (2) addressing the patenting challenges of small
entities.
In sum, current proposals and recent changes to the patent
statute made by the AIA address some of the patent challenges
facing entrepreneurs and small entities, but do not go far enough.
The prioritized examination program for small entities, as set
forth in this Article, attempts to address some of the patenting
challenges facing small entities while striving to maintain patent
examination quality. Given its current infrastructure, the
USPTO could easily implement the program on a trial basis.
While it is impossible to predict the result, the literature
suggests that such a program could be useful and have a positive
long-term impact on U.S. innovation.
... See MPEP, supra note 179, § 708.02(XII).
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